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The initiation in criminal activities is, typically, a young phenomenon. The study of 
the determinants of entry into criminal activities should pay attention to major events 
affecting youth. In many countries, one of these important events is mandatory 
participation in military service. The objective of this study is to estimate the causal 
relationship between mandatory participation in military service and crime. We 
exploit the random assignment through a draft lottery of young men to conscription in 
Argentina to identify this causal effect. Our results suggest that participation in 
military service increased the likelihood of developing a criminal record in adulthood 
(in particular, for property and weapon-related crimes). 
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The initiation in criminal activities is, typically, a young phenomenon. Most criminals 
begin their participation in illegal activities as juvenile or young adult offenders. The 
study of the determinants of entry into criminal activities should pay particular attention 
to major events affecting youth. In many countries one of these important events is 
mandatory participation in military service. In particular, a hypothesis that is worth 
studying is whether military training affects negatively or positively young men’s 
propensities toward violent and criminal behavior. 
Specifically, the objective of this study is to estimate the causal relationship between 
mandatory participation in military service (also called conscription) and crime. Military 
training could affect young men’s involvement in violent and criminal behavior through a 
variety of mechanisms: (i) military training teaches young men obedience and discipline, 
which could affect their rates of criminality; (ii) military service can affect the labor 
market prospects of young men positively or negatively. By delaying the insertion of 
young men into the labor market, it might affect future labor market prospects negatively, 
increasing their likelihood of committing property crimes. On the other hand, by 
improving their health and nutrition and also by extending their social network, it might 
affect labor market prospects positively (preventing them from committing property 
crimes); (iii) military training might permanently break down the mind’s natural barriers 
to committing violent acts (Grossman, 2000; Grossman and Siddle, 2000); (iv) military 
service provides firearm training that can reduce the entry costs into crime, increasing the 
participation in arms-related crimes; and (v) military service incapacitates the 
commission of crime for long periods of time by keeping young men in military facilities 
and out of the streets. 
In order to identify a causal relationship between conscription and crime, we need to 
identify a variable that affects participation in military service but does not affect crime 
through other mechanisms. To solve this problem we take advantage of the Argentine 
conscription lottery, which randomly assigned eligibility of young males to provision of 
military service based on the last three numbers of their national ID. Hence, for reasons 
totally unrelated to their underlying levels of aggression or criminality, some men were 
selected for conscription service whereas others were not. We then analyze the causal 
effect of this randomly assigned eligibility variable on the likelihood of having a criminal 
record.   3
Our results suggest that participation in military service did not reduce and, probably, 
increased the likelihood of developing a criminal record in adulthood. Perhaps the 
firearm training received during military service reduced the entry costs into crime or the 
natural barriers to committing violent acts. In particular, our regressions by type of crime 
suggest a small, but significant, positive impact of military service on participation in 
arm-related crimes. It may also be the case that military service delayed the insertion of 
the young into the labor market, affecting future opportunities. Our results by type of 
crime also indicate a significant positive impact of military service on participation in 
property crimes. 
Although military service in Argentina was interrupted in 1995, the conclusions of 
our study can still be relevant for several other countries. For example, Brazil, China, 
Egypt, Germany, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, and Turkey 
have mandatory conscription and there have been discussions on the convenience of its 
interruption. Other countries, instead, have been discussing the possibility of re-
implementing conscription. For example, as a response to the violent crisis in the Paris 
suburbs in 2005, French president Jacques Chirac announced the creation of a voluntary 
civil service of six to twelve months duration aimed at youngsters “who failed school and 
are in the process of social marginalization”.
1 Our results do not encourage the 
reintroduction of military service for anti-crime purposes. 
Section II reviews the literature, Section III describes the data, and Section IV 
presents our econometric methods. The results are reported in Section V, while Section 
VI concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Previous studies have exploited the random assignment by draft lotteries to provision 
of military service in war times. The evidence shows that being drafted into the military 
can actually hurt future earnings. Angrist (1990) uses the Vietnam-era draft lottery to 
show that military service in the Vietnam era reduced the civilian earnings of white 
veterans in the US, and probably had no effect on nonwhite veterans. Angrist and 
                                                 
1 See Le Monde.com, “Jacques Chirac lance le service civil volontaire”, (“Jacques Chirac launches the 
Voluntary Civil Service”), November 17, 2005. On the relationship between youth unemployment and 
crime in France, see Fougere, Kramarz, and Pouget (2006). On the practice of military conscription around 
the world, see Mulligan and Shleifer (2004).   4
Krueger (1994) used a similar strategy to show that even though simple comparisons 
suggest that World War II veterans earn more than non-veterans of the same age, the 
causal effect of military service in World War II is probable negative.
2 The natural 
experiment generated by the Vietnam draft lottery has been also exploited to analyze the 
impact of military service on alcohol consumption (Goldberg et al., 1991), and mortality 
(Hearst, Newman, and Hulley, 1986). 
The impact of being a Vietnam War veteran on criminal and violent behavior has 
been analyzed by Rholfs (2005), who finds that men who were draft age in the Vietnam 
era are more likely than average to report having committed sexual assaults. However, 
the effect of the draft lottery on incarcerations is fairly small. In order to reconcile these 
insignificant results for the incarceration rates with the results for self-reported sexual 
assault, he speculates that the military service could have made veterans more honest 
self-reporters, or that the reported sexual assaults could have been committed in Vietnam. 
McFall et al. (1999) test the hypothesis that male Vietnam veterans seeking inpatient 
treatment for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) exhibit more violent behavior 
compared with a mixed diagnostic group of male psychiatric inpatients without PTSD 
and a community sample of Vietnam veterans with PTSD not undergoing inpatient 
treatment. Violent acts assessed included property destruction, threats without a weapon, 
physical fighting, and threats with a weapon. PTSD inpatients engaged in more types of 
violent behavior than both comparison groups.  
Yager, Laufer, and Gallops (1984) find positive correlations between combat 
exposure and arrests and convictions. They find this association primarily for non-violent 
crimes. Mumola (2000) finds that veterans are no more likely to be in prison than are 
non-veterans of the same age. Among those in jail, however, he finds that veterans are 
more likely than non-veterans to have committed violent crimes. Instead, Bouffard 
(2003) finds that men who served in the Vietnam Era were slightly less likely than 
average to commit crimes as adults.  
Using a sample that is not restricted to Vietnam veterans, DeFronzo and Prochnow 
(2004) find that higher rates of male serial killer activity were associated with a local 
state culture supportive of game hunting, military training, and a local culture supportive 
                                                 
2 At the macro level, Keller, Poutvaara, and Wagener (2006) find a negative effect of mandatory military 
service on countries’ economic performance.   5
of punitive violence. Their findings, however, must be viewed with caution since results 
are based on correlations which cannot be causally interpreted. 
Most of the subjects covered on these studies on the Vietnam draft were exposed to 
real combat. Instead, in our case we analyze the impact of conscription on crime by using 
a dataset on subjects that were drafted for military service in peace times (with the 
exception of two cohorts during the Malvinas war). 
 
III. Data 
From 1901 through 1995 military service in Argentina was mandatory. Initially, 
young males were called to serve at the age of 21, and, later, at age 18. The last cohort 
serving at the age of 21 was the cohort born in 1955, whereas the first cohort serving at 
the age of 18 was the cohort born in 1958. Cohorts born in 1956 and 1957 were not called 
to serve in military service. 
Each year a lottery system assigned a number between 1 and 1000 to each of the last 
three numbers of “candidate’s” national IDs. A cutoff number was announced and those 
“candidates” whose ID number corresponded to a lottery number above the cutoff were 
eligible to serve on the military service. Final selection of individuals for military 
conscription from the draft-eligible was based on the pre-induction physical examination 
and the examination for mental aptitude.
3 Among those lottery numbers eligible for 
conscription, the lowest numbers were assigned to the Army, the intermediate numbers to 
the Air Force, and the highest numbers to the Navy. Conscription in the Navy lasted for 
two years, whereas the duration was one year in the Army and the Air Force. 
Exploiting this random assignment, we will try to answer whether conscription 
incentives or disincentives involvement in criminal activities. To answer this question we 
use individual-level datasets on men that went through the criminal justice process. We 
have two datasets provided by the Justice Ministry. One dataset has information of all 
men that went through criminal justice process since 1934 (about one million 
observations). This database includes information on the last three ID number and the 
                                                 
3 As pointed out by Angrist (1990), the fact that the selection process for entry into the military service was 
ultimately not random does not imply that the priority for induction was not randomly assigned. In our 
case, although some upper class youth could have used influences to avoid, shorten, or ameliorate their 
conscription time, this was basically not an option for low class youth, the ones more prone to involvement 
in criminal activities.   6
year of birth, but it does not specify the type of crime.
4 The other dataset covers a shorter 
period of time, but it details the type of crime that originated the criminal process. This 
second database has detailed information on all men that went through the criminal 
justice process since 2000 (about a quarter of one million observations), and includes the 
last three ID numbers, year of birth, and type of crime.  
We have information on cutoff numbers for cohorts of 1927 to 1975.
5 For cohorts of 
1931 to 1933, 1935 to 1936, 1938, and 1941 the cutoff number was equal to zero. For 
cohorts of 1966 to 1975 the cutoff number was different by military districts (29 military 
districts), and our data do not allow the association of each individual to a particular 
military district. Since for some years the difference in cutoff numbers by military district 
was important (a difference of more than 600 numbers between the maximum cutoff and 
the minimum) we exclude the cohorts of 1966 to 1975 from our sample. For the cohorts 
of 1955 and 1965 the cutoff number was different by army corp (there were 5 army corps 
-cuerpos de ejército- in the whole country), but the difference between maximum and 
minimum cutoff numbers was small. We include these cohorts in our sample, but in order 
to avoid measurement error, our regressions exclude all ID numbers with lottery numbers 
in between the maximum and the minimum cutoff, reducing in this way the number of 
observations available for cohorts of 1955 and 1965. 
 
IV. Econometric Methods 
In our case, estimation of average intention-to-treatment effects is straightforward. 
First, we define the dummy variable Low Number, which varies by ID number and 
cohort of birth. Low Number takes the value of one if the lottery number randomly 
assigned to ID i in cohort c was not draft eligible, and zero otherwise. Thus, this variable 
identifies the intention-to-treat on the population and is randomly assigned. We then 
estimate the intention-to-treat causal effect of military service on crime by estimating the 
following regression model: 
ci ci c Crime Rate  Low Number ci α γδ ε = ++ +  
                                                 
4 The complete ID number was not provided for confidentiality reasons. 
5 The cohort of 1976 faced the conscription draft lottery but it was not incorporated.   7
where  ci Crime Rate  is the average crime rate of cohort c and ID i (calculated as the ratio 
of men of cohort c and ID i who have a criminal record divided by the total size of cohort 
c and ID i),  c δ  is a cohort effect, γ  is the parameter of interest, and  ci ε  is the error term.  
In the reduced form equation, the coefficient γ  estimates the intention-to-treat (ITT) 
effect. The coefficient of interest from an IV regression (the Local Average Treatment 









where p1 is the probability of doing the military service given an ID number that was 
made eligible for military service by the lottery, and p2 is the probability of doing the 
military service given an ID number that was not made eligible for military service by the 
lottery (volunteers into the military service).  
According to information provided by the Argentine Army,
6 the number of volunteers 
into the military service was basically nil during the sample period ( ) 2 0 p ≅ , so the 
denominator in the above expression is approximately equal to p1. We have information 
on size of cohorts and total number of men incorporated into the military service by 
cohort, so we can estimate the value of p1 as the ratio of incorporation to cohort size. 
 
V. Results 
Our results suggest that conscription is likely to increase crime rates. In Table 1, 
using the dataset that includes all men that went through criminal justice process since 
1934, we consistently find a reduction in crime rates on those ID numbers that were not 
made eligible for military service by the lottery. In column (1) we present the regression 
for the cohorts of 1929 to 1965, where we estimate that military service significantly 
increases crime rates of draft eligible individuals by 1.62%.
7 In columns (2) and (3) we 
separate our sample by the time when military service changed the age of incorporation 
                                                 
6 Oficina de Reclutamiento y Movilización, Estado Mayor del Ejército Argentino. 
7 We also add ID fixed effects to the model in column (1) to check the robustness of this result to a possible 
non-random assignment of ID numbers in the population. Results are exactly as the model in column (1), 
indicating that there is no evidence of this possible source of confounding in our data. All regressions 
mentioned but not shown are available from the authors upon request.   8
from 21 years to 18 years. The effect appears larger in the latter period, and it is not 
significant for the earlier period. However, this cannot be only attributed to the change in 
the age of enrollment, as several conditions could have changed for the cohorts of 1958 to 
1965 relative to the cohorts of 1929 to 1955 and these changes would be correlated with 
the cohorts.
8  
In Table 2 we run two false experiments to guarantee that the lottery was truly 
random and that we are not picking anything else in our estimates. In model (1) the 
sample is restricted to those observations with low number. We sort the low numbers for 
each cohort and divide them by their median, assigning a false treatment to the upper half 
of numbers. We find no difference in crime rates between these groups as one would 
expect, since none of them were draft eligible. In model (2) the sample is restricted to 
cohorts 1956 and 1957 (which fully skipped military service because of the change in the 
age of incorporation from 21 years to 18 years), using Low Numbers corresponding to 
cohorts 1958 and 1959. Again, since these cohorts were not drafted, we should not 
observe any significant crime differences between the two groups. This is indeed the 
case. 
In Table 3, we explore some differential effects. In column (1) we show that the 
effect of conscription on crime seems to have been homogenous for draftees providing 
military service during democratic and dictatorial governments. In columns (2) and (4) 
we show that the effect of military service on crime is larger for those draftees in the 
cohort that participated in the Malvinas War. Finally, we find some evidence that the 
effect of conscription on crime was also larger for those that did the military service in 
the Navy, which served for two years instead of the one year served in the Army and the 
Air Force.  
In summary, our results suggest that participation in military service increased the 
likelihood of developing a criminal record in adulthood. Perhaps the firearm training 
received during military service reduced the entry costs into crime or the natural barriers 
to committing violent acts. It may also be the case that military service delayed the 
insertion of the young into the labor market affecting future opportunities. This last 
interpretation is consistent wit the additional deleterious effect observed for those that 
provided service in the Navy for two years.  
                                                 
8 All these exercises were repeated using a Tobit specification. In all cases the results are robust to the 
presence of censoring at zero in our dataset.   9
To try to shed additional light on these hypotheses we use an alternative dataset that 
covers a shorter period of time, but includes the type of crime. Whereas the database we 
have used so far has information on all men that went through the criminal justice process 
since 1934, a newer database has information on all men that went through the criminal 
justice process since 2000, but which details the type of crime under process. 
A potential drawback of the alternative database is that the type of crime is actually 
specified for 37.4% of the cases. Therefore, in order to check its validity in Table 4 we 
first reproduce the results from Table 1 including all observations. For all the time 
periods, the coefficients on Low Number are not significantly different from the ones 
obtained in Table 1. Then we separately reproduce the results for those observations 
where the type of crime is specified and for those observations where the type of crime is 
not specified. As shown in Table 4, for all the time periods the estimated coefficients on 
Low Number when we include those observations where the type of crime is specified 
are not significantly different from coefficients obtained when the sample includes those 
observations where the type of crime not specified. This result suggests that Low Number 
is not correlated with missing values in the database. 
 In Table 5, we estimate the effect of military service by type of crime for cohorts of 
1958 to 1965. Remarkably, the coefficient on Low Number in column (7) is negative and 
significant at the 1% level suggesting an impact of military service on arm-related crime 
rates. This result is in line with the hypothesis that firearm training received during 
military service reduces entry costs into crime, though the value of the coefficient 
indicates that the impact through this pathway is small. 
As discussed above, an alternative hypothesis is that military service may negatively 
affect the labor market prospects of young men by delaying their insertion in the labor 
market, thus inducing them to commit property crimes. This hypothesis implies that 
property crime should be lower for those men not serving in military service. The 
coefficients associated to Low Number in the regression on property crime presented in 
columns (1) is negative and significant, a result that is in line with this hypothesis. 
In column (1) of Table 6 we present results of the impact of conscription on 
participation in the formal job market. The coefficient of Low Number in this 
specification is positive and significant at the 10% level, also suggesting that military 
service has a negative impact on the probability of participating in the formal job market.   10
Finally, we explore whether the estimated effects could be the result of different 
migration or mortality rates affecting those that provided military service. Using the 
national ballot registry (voting is mandatory in Argentina), column (2) of Table 6 shows 
that conscription does not affect the probability of being alive and living in Argentina. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
The objective of this study is to estimate the causal relationship between mandatory 
participation in military service and crime. A priori, different hypotheses could predict a 
positive or negative effect of military service on involvement in criminal behavior. We 
exploit the random assignment through a draft lottery of young men to conscription in 
Argentina to identify this causal effect. Our results suggest that participation in military 
service increased the likelihood of developing a criminal record in adulthood.  
Additional evidence suggests two particular channels through which this effect could 
have operated. The significant effect of military service on arms-related crimes suggests 
that the firearm training received during military service may have reduced the entry 
costs into crime or the natural barriers to committing violent acts. Moreover, the 
significant effect of military service on crimes against property and the estimation of the 
largest effect for individuals that provided two years, rather than one, of military service 
may imply that military service delayed the insertion of the young into the labor market, 
affecting their future opportunities.  
To sum up, our results do not encourage the introduction of military service on anti-
crime grounds.   11
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Table 1. Estimates of the impact of conscription on crime 
  Dependent variable: Crime Rate 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Low Number (=1)  -.00063***  -.00025  -.00114*** 
 [.00020]  [.00023]  [.00031] 
LATE -0.0010  -0.0004  -0.0017 
% Δ  LATE  -1.616 -0.712 -2.580 
Cohorts 1929-65 1929-55 1958-65 
Observations 34904  26976  7928 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by cohort-Low Number are shown in brackets. All models include 
cohort dummies and are estimated by OLS. LATE is the Local Average Treatment Effect and it is 
estimated as the ratio of the coefficient on the Low Number variable to the proportion of men with 
High Number that were incorporated into the military service. % Δ LATE is calculated as 
100*LATE/mean crime rate of Low Number IDs. *Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 
5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level.  
   14
 
Table 2. Estimates of the impact of conscription on crime – False experiments 
  Dependent variable: Crime Rate 
  (1) (2) 
Very Low Number  .00007   
 (.00046)   
Low Number    -.00055 
   (.00097) 
Observations 5485  2000 
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. All models include cohort dummies and 
are estimated by OLS. In model (1) the sample is restricted to those observations with low number. In model 
(2) the sample is restricted to cohorts 1956 and 1957, using Low Numbers corresponding to cohorts of 1958 
and 1959. *Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 3. Additional estimates of the impact of conscription on crime 
  Dependent variable: Crime Rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Low  Number  (=1)  -.00073** -.00047** -.00054** -.00085** -.00096** 
  [.00037] [.00018] [.00020] [.00036] [.00037] 
Malvinas*Low Number    -.0015***   -.0011**   
    [.00036]  [.00049]  
Militar Government*Low Number  -.00046         
  [.00034]      
21 years old*Low Number  -.00072*         
  [.00038]      
Navy (=1)      .00063*    .00107 
     [.00037]  [.00087] 
Cohorts  1929-65 1929-65 1929-65 1958-65 1958-65 
Observations 34904  34904  34904  7928 7928 
Notes: Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets. Standard errors in models (1), (2), and (4) are 
clustered by cohort-Low Number and standard errors in models (3) and (5) are clustered by cohort-
Low Number-Navy. All models include cohort dummies and are estimated by OLS. *Significant at 
the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level. 
   16
Table 4. Estimates of the impact of conscription on crime – Alternative database 
  Dependent variable: Crime Rate 
  Database including all observations 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Low Number  -.00056**  -1.20e-06  -.00131*** 
 [.00024]  [.00025]  [.00038] 
  Database including those observations where the type of crime is specified 
 (4)  (5)  (6) 
Low Number  -.00032**  -.000026  -.00079*** 
 [.00015]  [.00014]  [.00023] 
  Database including those observations where the type of crime is not specified 
 (7)  (8)  (9) 
Low Number  -.00023*  -.000028  -.00051** 
 [.00014]  [.00015]  [.00023] 
Cohorts 1929-65 1929-55 1958-65 
Observations 34904  26976  7928 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by cohort-Low Number are shown in brackets. All models include 
cohort dummies and are estimated by OLS. *Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; 
***Significant at the 1% level.   17
 Table 5. Estimates of the impact of conscription on crime rates, by type of crime   


















Low Number   -.00025*  -.00002  .00003  -.00011**  5.63e-06  -.00021  -.00006*** 
(=1) [.00014]  [.00004]  [.00004]  [.00004] [.00005]  [.00012] [.00002] 
LATE  -.00038 -.00003 .00005 -.00017 .00001  -.00032 -.00009 
% Δ  LATE -1.615 -0.129 0.194 -0.710 0.036  -1.356 -0.387 
Cohorts  1958-65 1958-65 1958-65 1958-65 1958-65  1958-65 1958-65 
Observations 7928  7928  7928  7928  7928  7928  7928 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by cohort-Low Number-High Number are shown in brackets. All models 
include cohort dummies and are estimated by OLS. LATE is the Local Average Treatment Effect and it is 
estimated as the ratio of the coefficient on the Low Number variable to the proportion of men with High 
Number that were incorporated into the military service. % Δ LATE is calculated as 100*LATE/mean crime 
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Table 6. Estimates of the impact of conscription on job market participation and 
mortality and migration rates 
  Dependent Variable: 
  Participation in the Formal Job Market  Registration for National Election 
Low Number (=1) .00182* .39361 
  [.00096] [.33672] 
Cohorts 1958-65  1958-65 
Observations 7928  7928 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by cohort-Low Number-High Number are shown in brackets. All 
models include cohort dummies and are estimated by OLS. *Significant at the 10% level; 
**Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level. 
   
 